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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the influence of having council appointed mayors on local governments. Five 
elements of local government systems are considered: the electoral system and its influence on the political 
composition of the local government; the local government structure and the distribution of functions and 
powers between mayor and council; the role of political parties; scrutiny of the executive and accountability; 
and citizen participation. This analysis highlights the effect that a council appointed mayor system has in 
terms of accountability and legitimacy, transparency and efficiency.
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RESUMEN
El presente artículo toma en consideración los efectos  que el sistema de elección del Alcalde tiene  sobre 
la democracia local, basándose en la consideración cinco aspectos: el sistema electoral y su influencia 
en la composición política de las administraciones locales; la estructura de la administración local  y la 
distribución de funciones entre los alcaldes y el pleno municipal; el papel de los partidos políticos; los 
mecanismos de control del ejecutivo local y la participación ciudadana. El estudio subraya especialmente  
la incidencia que el sistema de elección del alcalde por los concejales tiene en relación con los principios 
de responsabilidad, legitimidad, transparencia y  eficiencia de la gestión local.
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1. INTROdUCTION
According to the Constitution Spain is divided into a three-tier structure: the central government, 
autonomous governments and local governments. The power is divided according to this division. Local 
governments are comprised of municipalities and provinces.
•	 Some municipalities are ruled according to a direct democracy system. These are municipalities 
that contain fewer than 100 inhabitants, or that have historically adopted this system. They are 
comprised of:
– a mayor, elected directly by residents.
– an assembly, comprised of those citizens who are entitled to vote.
In the case of larger municipalities, which are the majority, mayors are elected by the council or according 
to the following procedure established by the Local Government Act:
•	 Members of the council must nominate one of their members to be appointed mayor
•	 The candidate must obtain an absolute majority to be appointed mayor.
•	 If the required number of votes is not obtained, there is a second-round, in which the candidate who 
obtains a simple majority is appointed mayor.
•	 If the required number of votes is not reached, the election system turns towards an automatic 
election, according to which the person who ranks first on the largest party electoral list is appointed 
mayor.
Nevertheless, in Spain, an electoral reform in which a directly elected mayor system should replace the 
system based on council-appointed leaders has been suggested. The reasons for this new system to be 
implemented are directly related to an attempt to enhance democratic requirements such as transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy and efficiency.
The debate around directly elected mayors is currently particularly topical (e.g. Bäck, Heinelt, & Mag-
nier, 2006; Bottom & Reiser, 2014; Eckersley & Timm-Arnold, 2014; Elcock, 2008; Hambleton & Sweeting, 
2014;), as changes concerning European local governments have recently taken effect in parts of Europe 
(Page, E. & Goldsmith, M., 1987; Goldsmith, M., 1990,1992; Hesse, J. & Sharpe, L. J.,1991; Denters, B. 
& Rose, L., 2005; Copus, C., 2006; Bennett, R., 1993; Sánchez Blanco, A., 2003). These developments ac-
count for changes in local political leadership and are likely to bring about further change (Bäck, Heinelt, & 
Magnier, 2006). In this paper, we aim to give a contribution on this issue by discussing the possible effects 
on local democracy that account for a council appointed mayor system versus a system based on directly 
elected mayors (Ridao J. & García A., 2015; Mahíllo, P. & Galán, A., 2015).
2. FACTORS AFFECTINg lOCAl dEMOCRACy
We will focus our analysis on four specific variables: the local electoral system and its influence on the 
political composition of the local government; the local government structure and the distribution of functions 
and powers between the mayor and the council; the role of political parties; the scrutiny and accountability of 
the local government and governance and citizen participation.
These dimensions have been chosen both for their connections with the goals that have often triggered 
the shift towards the introduction of the direct election of the mayor and because they have been considered 
as relevant by the main literature.
 The Mayoral election system and its influences on the political composition of the government
The election of the Mayor on the basis of a direct election or on the basis of a council appointment 
have different consequences, which, at the same time affects the composition of the local authority. It 
is part of this study to analyse how the system adopted can increase political pluralism in councils and 
foster a different composition of the legislative and executive branches and the relationship between 
them.
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 Local government structure and the distribution of functions and powers 
between the mayor and the council
It is undeniable that the way in which the mayor is elected has an impact on the internal structure of local 
governments as well as on the distribution of functions between mayors and councils. Accordingly, one of the 
goals of our study is to determine the effects of a mayoral election system on the internal structure of local 
governments, their organization and the distribution of functions in order to determine what the difference is 
in terms of distribution and separation of powers (Denters, B.,2006).
The role of political parties
It is also part of this study to determine how the role of political parties can change, depending on the elec-
toral system and depending on who elects the mayor. The independence of the mayor and the lack of a direct 
link with a political party make a difference in the role of political parties regarding the decision-making process. 
The importance of the political parties on the electoral process has been pointed out by other scholars (Bottom 
& Raiser, 2014), but apart from that, they can also have an influence in the decision-making process, if the con-
nection between the decision-makers and the political parties is close enough to allow such a thing to happen 
(HM Government, 1993). This is especially true when mayors are chosen within the ruling party’s apparatus. 
Whenever there is a dependence between people in local governments and national parties, the latter hold 
tight control over their representatives in the local council in all matters, including coalition formation and voting.
Scrutiny, executive action and accountability
The legal mechanisms established to hold the mayor and the executive branch of the local government 
to account are closely related to the way in which mayors are elected. There is also a close relationship bet-
ween the effects of such mechanisms on the executive branch of the government and its continuity in power.
Governance and citizen participation
The choice between a directly elected mayor and a mayor appointed by the council has an influence on 
the participation of citizens in local elections, making them more or less interested in taking part in local elec-
tions. Therefore, turnout depends on their perception of the local authority when it comes to proximity to their 
interests and representativeness. In that sense it is interesting to analyse how the shift to a directly elected 
mayor system may have an influence on voting behaviour, making voters more interested in taking part in the 
electoral process (Colin Copus & Michael Dadd, 2014; Ragin, C. C., 1994).
3.  A BRIEF dESCRIPTION OF ThE SPANISh lOCAl gOvERNMENT SySTEM: 
A COUNCIl-APPOINTEd MAyOR
The electoral system and its influence on the composition of local governments
Generally speaking, it can be said that the local electoral system in Spain is based on a model, according 
to which mayors are appointed by the council (Martínez Marín,1989). Directly elected mayors are an excep-
tion that the Spanish constitution specifies for small municipalities (i.e. those with fewer than 100 inhabitants) 
in which the residents (who have the right to cast their votes) happen to rule the council based on the prin-
ciple of direct democracy (Martín Retortillo, 1982). Contrary to what happens in other countries, such as the 
UK, where local councils hold referendums on the question of whether or not to introduce an elected mayor, 
Spanish authorities are not obliged to consult local residents on their governance arrangements in order to 
ascertain demand for a directly elected mayoral system.
The Spanish constitution does not state which system is to be adopted by larger municipalities (Jiménez 
Asensio, 2001), as the parliament has the power to pass statutory legislation (Parejo Alfonso, 1987) to esta-
blish a directly elected mayor system or a council appointed mayor system. In that sense, the General Elec-
toral Act, 5, 19/06/1985 establishes a council appointed mayor system, except in those small municipalities, 
in which a directly elected mayor system is provided by the Constitution (Vallés, 1986).
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According to the aforementioned Law, the electorate votes for councillors by choosing from a list of 
candidates that has been put forward by the political parties, so that voters’ choice has mainly to do with the 
election of the political party they would like to see ruling the council (Sánchez Morón, 1992). In adopting 
this electoral system, citizens vote for political parties rather than for individuals. The number of seats that 
each political party obtains in the council is based on a system of proportional representation. The benefits of 
proportional representation have been highlighted by several authors (Cosculluela Montaner, 2011; Muñoz 
Machado & Cosculluela Montaner, 1979).
This system implies that the largest party in the local government is successful in forming a coalition and 
capturing the greatest number of seats, so that it can appoint the mayor. In practice, the mayor is always the 
leader of the party with the greatest number of seats. The majority of councils are controlled by one of the 
main political parties or by some coalition of political parties. Thus, the largest political party, or a coalition of 
parties, forms a majority group which controls the council. The next largest group forms the opposition. The 
political party that captures the greatest number of seats dominates the decision-making process.
It is a council appointed mayor system, but, if the required number of votes is not obtained, then there is 
an automatic election, as stated by the Local Government Act (García García, 2011).
The election of the council on the basis of a proportional representation system fosters a plurality of po-
litical parties (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002), which makes it difficult to reach agreements between the different 
political parties, which happen to have a seat in the council. In contests where three or more parties stand, 
the winning candidate frequently receives fewer than 50 percent of the votes cast. Thus, the electoral system 
often delivers hung councils, that is, councils in which no single party holds more than half the seats available.
The local government structure and the distribution of functions and powers 
between Mayor and council
The structure of local authorities may vary from one municipality to another depending on the number 
of inhabitants. In the case of municipalities with a small number of inhabitants (i.e. fewer than 100) or muni-
cipalities that have historically adopted this way of government, the power lies with all the residents who are 
entitled to cast a vote. They gather in an assembly that has the power to make decisions. This assembly is 
presided over by a mayor who has been elected by the members of the assembly (García Fernández, 2001; 
Parejo Alfonso, 2004).
Nevertheless, the system described above is an exception, since the majority of the municipalities adopt 
a different structure (Fanlo Lora, A.,1990; García Morillo, J., 1998; Mercadal Vidal, 1988; Morell Ocaña, 
1988; Norton, A. 1994). This structure is as follows:
1. A mayor and a committee of councillors have executive functions. The committee is chosen by the 
mayor (Ortega, 1991), that is, the mayor forms a cabinet from among the councillors. The mayor and 
committee hold most of the executive powers (Copus, C., 2006). . Each member of the committee 
has responsibility for a key area of the authority’s functions. However, there are regular meetings of 
the full council, presided over by the mayor or chairman, which all members of the authority attend. 
Committee members have responsibility for particular areas of policy, and the mayor can delegate 
executive powers to such members, individually or collectively. This committee is not required to be 
politically balanced, since it can consist of members of just one party. The executive can, thus, formally 
be made up of a single political party or a coalition of parties.
2. The council or backbench councillors represent their electorate, share in the policy and budget 
decisions of the full council, suggest policy improvements, scrutinize the executive, and pass 
secondary legislation. Accordingly, the legislative power is held by the council, which is empowered to 
pass bye-laws. They also have the power to make executive decisions, in particular those that involve 
a great amount of public money. Therefore, some laws set out a strict division of the functions between 
the council, and the mayor and the committee, based on the amount of money involved (Calonge 
Velázquez, 2004-2005).
The relationship between the institutional design of local government and democratic accountability has 
been pointed out by some researchers (Baena del Alcazar, 2000; Aliende, 1996; Hambleton and Sweeting, 
2014). This structure does not feature a complete separation of roles between the executive and the council. 
The system can make it difficult for the council to reach agreement, since the decision-making process requi-
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res a quorum, and this is not always easy to achieve (Muñoz Machado, 2009). The latest reforms have tried 
to amend this situation by shifting power from the council to the mayor and the committee. At some point, it 
was thought that more executive powers should be transferred to the mayor and the committee, and this was 
done at the expense of the council, with the purpose of making it easier for local authorities to make decisions 
in a quicker and more effective way, according to local needs and interests. This resulted in a redistribution 
of power between both institutions, which increased the power of the mayor and the committee, even though 
they are not elected on the basis of a direct election of the mayor by the electorate.
To compensate for the powers that have been transferred to the executive branch, and also to prevent 
councillors from feeling excluded from the decision-making process, the council has another role: some of the 
councillors sit on an overview and scrutiny committee, on which there must be at least one councillor running 
executive arrangements (Parejo Alfonso, 2005). Their membership cannot include executive members of 
the council, and they must be politically balanced. The role of such committees is to review, scrutinize, make 
reports on, and issue recommendations concerning matters related to the council’s executive functions. The 
role of overview and scrutiny committees has been enhanced by requiring councils to respond publicly to 
such committees’ recommendations within two months of their having been made.
This is the reason the Local Government Act has been amended several times, in particular in 2003, in 
an attempt to redistribute the power between the mayor and the committee, and the council. In particular, the 
local government system that has been most affected by this reform is that of the larger cities. The reform 
implied transferring greater power to the mayor and the committee, as the executive branch of the local go-
vernment, so that they should propose the policy framework and implement policies within the subsequent 
agreed framework. This redistribution of power gives the executive branch of the local government more 
power to bypass (override) an uncooperative local council. Under these reforms, the role of the full council 
has been reasserted, particularly with regard to passing key strategies, by setting the policy framework (the 
array of annual performance plans and strategies relating to such issues as community safety, libraries, and 
sports), passing the budget, and appointing key officers. Furthermore, a key duty of local councillors is that 
of overview and scrutiny.
The backbench councillors (or council) are in charge of passing secondary legislation (bye-laws) and 
controlling the executive. However, the separation of power is not complete. The reform means shifting 
power from the local council to the mayors, and, as a result, it has changed the decision-making process and 
the way in which decisions are taken and for whom. The decision-making power of the executive has been 
increased at the expense of the council. However, to compensate for this, the role of the council has been 
redefined giving it increased control over the executive. The reforms, which shift power from the council to 
the mayor and the committee, mean a change in the roles of the council and of the mayor. In any case, this 
shift or move to a new distribution of power does not represent a change in the power available to the local 
authority. There has been a redistribution of power, so that the mayor and the committee take over most of 
the executive power of the council.
The role of political parties
Political parties have an important influence on local government in Spain. This influence is arguably 
greater than it should be in local governments, as they have a role, not only in the electoral process, but also 
once the elections have been held, as will be explained later (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2014).
All councillors are elected as members of political parties. Council candidates contest elections on behalf 
of registered political parties. Once elected to the council, councillors sit in party groups. It is a legal require-
ment that those standing as candidates for local authorities are members of a party. Political parties decide 
who is going to run for local elections. In most local authorities, councillors are elected on the basis of the 
political party that they represent.
Political parties also have an important role when it comes to the election of the mayor, as the person who 
ranks top on the electoral list is the one most likely to be elected mayor, whether elected by councillors or elec-
ted through the alternative system that the Local Government Act stipulates. mayors are dependent on their 
political parties because they owe their position to those party. Their principal loyalty is therefore to the party.
However, political parties have an influence, not only on the electoral process, but also once the election 
has taken place. This is because political parties meet on a regular basis to make policy decisions. The policy 
decisions of majority parties usually become council decisions in due course, after having been approved by 
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the council or by the committee. This is a way of enforcing party discipline, which has an effect on the smooth 
running of the authority.
What has been mentioned above also has an effect on relations between central and local governments. 
In Spain, the recent history of local government is one of excessive central government intervention. Local go-
vernments are often subject to constant reforms directed from the centre. Policy direction over local government 
tends to reflect a party’s national standing in relation to its results at general elections rather than local polls.
Scrutiny of the executive and accountability
In addition to passing laws and making budget-related decisions, the council is also concerned with the 
efficiency and efficacy of the day-to-day workings of the process of administration. To this end, and through 
a variety of procedures, the council seeks to scrutinize the activities of those who are responsible for making 
decisions and implementing local government policy (Sánchez Blanco, 1982). The council is responsible not 
only for legislating, but also for holding the mayor and the committee to account.
The principal procedures used for this purpose are political accountability mechanisms:
•	 Questions for oral answers. Oral questions provide the council with the opportunity to question the 
mayor and members of the committee at meetings. Three days’ notice of the proposed questions 
must be given.
•	 Select committee. These consist of a number of members, with the various parties being repre-
sented according to their proportion of seats in the council. There is a regular or permanent select 
committee that controls the actions of the executive. The setting up of this committee was due to the 
shift of power away from the council and to the mayor and the governing committee. This was a way 
of compensating for the shift of power and the greater power that was transferred to the executive 
branch of the government. This is the system of checks and balances.
Ad hoc select committees are also possible. They are appointed to investigate and report on 
specific topics.
These mechanisms are used, respectively, to extract information and explanations from gover-
nment, to debate government policy and administration, and to undertake detailed inquiries into 
government operations.
•	 Vote of no confidence. The drastic sanction of a vote of no confidence is the only method by which 
the council can enforce collective responsibility (González Trevijano,1996; Rebollo Puig, 1985; San-
tolaya Machetti, 1985). It requires the mayor and the governing committee to resign, if defeated by 
a vote of no confidence. The mayor and the committee will be forced to resign after losing a no-
confidence motion, even if only by one vote.
This situation forces the mayor and the committee to resign because it means that they are no longer in 
effective control of the local government’s affairs.
When the executive is defeated by a vote of no confidence, forcing the major to resign his post there is 
no need to hold interim elections, but a new mayor must be appointed. The promotion of a no-confidence 
motion by a certain number of councillors requires the proposal of a new candidate who will automatically be 
appointed if the no-confidence motion is successful.
There is no legal requirement for the councillors to remain in the same party once elected. Defections 
between parties on issues of principle and party discipline happen from time to time. Those councillors who 
leave their parties can join another party and can thereby cause the mayor to resign from his/her post.
When the vote of no confidence is linked with executive proposals, the procedure for appointing the new 
mayor is the same as the usual procedure for appointing a mayor (López Pellicer, 1990).
The reason the law to states this system is to prevent an impasse in decision-making. The lack of agree-
ment about important issues could hamper the local authority in adopting important decisions that are essen-
tial for the community, such as those that concern the budget.
Governance and citizen participation
The turnout for local elections in Spain as an indicator of public interest, and the health of local demo-
cracy has recently been a cause for concern, since it is significantly lower than it used to be.. In fact, the 
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local turnout is very similar to that in general elections. The reason the number of votes cast has decreased 
lately in Spain has to do with the feeling of dissatisfaction towards politics and politicians owing to the recent 
scandals related to corruption.
The system, according to which the candidate who ranks first on the electoral list usually becomes ma-
yor, enables people to identify the candidate who is running for mayor. Therefore, voters have a perception of 
representation that has an influence on voting behaviour, making them more interested in taking part in the 
electoral process (Sánchez Morón, 1992).
4.  dIRECTly ElECTEd MAyORS vS COUNCIl APPOINTEd MAyORS: 
EFFECTS ON lOCAl dEMOCRACy
1. One of the main purposes of suggesting a directly elected mayor is to improve local democracy in terms of 
transparency, accountability, legitimacy and efficiency. However, we have to point out that the achievement 
of those aims depends, not only on how the mayor is elected, but also on other factors, such as the local 
electoral law and how the power is divided between the mayor and the council. Institutions matter, and 
the choice of political-administrative structures makes a difference. In particular, the option of a directly 
elected mayor implies a redistribution of power between the executive branch of the local government and 
the council. Thus, this kind of reform strengthens the separation between executive and representative 
roles and functions; this involves a shift of power in the sense that the mayor and the governing committee 
are able to make decisions without the council taking part in them. Summing up, the first main effect is 
that the decision-making process and policy implementation may benefit from the introduction of directly 
elected mayors in terms of efficiency, as decisions are made more quickly because it is easier to reach 
agreements.
2. Nevertheless, to stabilize the local government, it is also necessary to establish an electoral system 
according to which the mayor is supported by the majority of the members in the council, because of the 
relationship between the role of the council passing secondary legislation and making decisions regarding 
budgets and policy implementation. In this perspective, a directly elected mayor system must be supported 
by an electoral system that ensures smooth of the decision-making. This is the reason a first-past-the-post 
electoral system has been established in Italy. This system guarantees that the majority of seats go to 
the party of which the mayor is member, even at the expense of the representativeness of citizens, who 
could be better represented when the electoral system is that of proportional representation. This system 
can lead to a situation in which a political party dominates the council, but this situation is not the result 
of an overwhelming advantage in terms of votes cast. From this point of view, legitimacy is based on 
policymakers providing local services efficiently rather than on the idea of policymakers representing the 
electorate; in other words, local government action is orientated towards output legitimacy.
3. The separation of roles between the governing committee and backbench councillors is said to enhance 
efficiency, transparency and accountability. However, the direct election of the mayor is not a requirement 
in terms of the separation of roles and functions, and the reinforcement of the executive branch of local 
authorities. Similar effects can be achieved in the context of an indirect election system, which is the case 
of Spain. Here, the same separation of roles and functions in order to make the decision-making process 
easier has been possible without having a directly elected mayor. To compensate for the loss of executive 
functions, the legislative branch of the executive is given more powers to control and supervise the actions 
of the executive.
4. It has also been argued that the democratic requirements are best met in those cases in which the mayor 
is directly elected by residents, since in these cases it is understood that the mayor is more legitimate in 
their role because of the fact that the citizens have elected them directly. At the same time, it is thought 
that citizens become more involved in elections, because they are voting directly for the person of their 
choice. The Spanish system shows that the same results can be achieved even in cases in which a mayor 
is elected by the councillors. The system according to which mayors are elected in Spain implies that the 
person who comes first in the list is likely to be appointed mayor. Therefore, although this is not a directly 
elected mayor system, citizens behave and cast their votes following a pattern that is very similar to that 
of other countries such as Italy, where the system means citizens vote for the mayor directly.
5. Political parties play an important role in those cases in which the election of the mayor follows an indirect 
election system. Parties are responsible for appointing the candidates who will run for elections, and, in 
María Jesús García García
Council Appointed Mayors in Spain: Effects on Local Democracy
REAlA. Nueva Época – N.o 6, noviembre 2016 – ISSN: 1989-8975 – [Págs. 70-78]
EXPERIENCIAS Y CASOS 77
the case of mayors, the candidate who ranks first in the list is the most likely to become mayor. Thus, the 
power of political parties to decide on this matter is particularly relevant. Candidates stand for elections 
on the basis of party positions. This arrangement also plays a decisive role after the elections, since 
political parties often tend to attempt to influence the decision-making process by persuading councillors 
or even mayors to make those decisions that best fit with their general policy. This system promotes party 
discipline among the members of the council, and so policy decisions of majority parties usually become 
council decisions. In contrast, in those political systems in which mayors are directly elected by citizens, 
the connection between political parties and mayors tends to be less strong. This system also separates 
mayors from council politics and reduces the power of parties in policymaking.
6. In terms of accountability, the option of a directly elected mayor or a council-appointed mayor determines 
the way in which the mayor is held to account. In the case of a council appointed mayor, the local leader 
is held to account by the full council through a vote of confidence, which is directly related to the way 
in which they are appointed. Moreover, the shift of power between the mayor and the full council has 
prompted the reinforcement of those functions of control and scrutiny as a mechanism to compensate 
for the loss of executive power. In the case of directly elected mayors, they are primarily accountable to 
the electorate, since the latter has the power to reinstate mayors in their positions by re-electing them at 
the next elections. In Italy, there are also mechanisms to force the mayor and the governing committee 
to resign from their posts, but they are unlikely to be used. This matter also raises a problem regarding 
the capability and legitimacy of the council to remove the mayor from his or her office, since mayors have 
been elected by voters, not by the council, and it stands to reason that those who have the option to 
choose the mayor must be also those who hold the power to remove the mayor from his or her post.
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